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Abstract
For an ID-based key exchange (KE) protocol, KGS forward secrecy is about the protection of previously established session
keys after the master secret key of the Key Generation Server (KGS) is compromised. This is the strongest notion of forward
secrecy that one can provide for an ID-based KE protocol. Among all the comparable protocols, there are only a few of them that
provide this level of forward secrecy, and all of these protocols require expensive bilinear pairing operations and map-to-point
hash operations that may not be suitable for implementation on low-power devices such as sensors. In this paper, we propose a
new ID-based KE protocol which does not need any pairing or map-to-point hash operations. It also supports the strongest KGS
forward secrecy. On its performance, we show that it is faster than previously proposed protocols in this category. Our protocol is a
signature-based one, in which the signature scheme is a variant of a scheme proposed by Bellare et al. in Eurocrypt 2004. We show
that the variant we proposed is secure, and also requires either less storage space or runtime computation than the original scheme.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the first set of identity-based (ID-based) Key Exchange (KE) protocols were proposed [24,20,18,17] in the
late ’80s and early ’90s, there has been a revival of interest in ID-based KE protocols recently [27,28,15,23] due to
the discovery of several new applications of pairings on elliptic curves [10].
On security, most of them [24,18,17,27,28,23]1 only support partial or perfect forward secrecy but not KGS
forward secrecy [20,15], the strongest notion of forward secrecy in the context of ID-based KE protocols. By partial
forward secrecy, the previously established session keys will remain secure after the secret key of one communicating
party is compromised. By perfect forward secrecy, the previously established session keys will remain secure after
the secret keys of both communicating parties are compromised. By KGS (Key Generation Server) forward secrecy,
I A preliminary version appears in the Proc. of the First Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005) [R.W. Zhu, G. Yang, D.S.
Wong, An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices, in: Internet and Network Economics:
First International Workshop, WINE 2005, in: LNCS, vol. 3828, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 500–509].
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 2788 8020; fax: +852 2788 8614.
E-mail addresses: zhuwei@cs.cityu.edu.hk (R.W. Zhu), csyanggm@cs.cityu.edu.hk (G. Yang), duncan@cs.cityu.edu.hk,
duncan@cityu.edu.hk (D.S. Wong).
1 Some protocols in [24,18] may be able to provide KGS forward secrecy under some condition specified in [12].
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the previously established session keys will still remain secure even after the long-term secret key of the KGS is
compromised. Note that compromising the KGS secret key implies compromising the secret keys of all parties in an
ID-based cryptosystem. Hence, KGS forward secrecy is the strongest notion among these three.
On performance, according to the state-of-the-art results in [1,2], one bilinear pairing operation requires at least
10 times more multiplications in the underlying finite field than an elliptic curve point scalar multiplication does
in the same finite field. For low-power devices such as sensors, cellphones, and low-end PDAs, which are usually
characterized by limited battery lifetime and low computational power, applications using bilinear pairings can be too
expensive to implement. In addition, most of the ID-based cryptosystems require a special hash function called map-
to-point hash function [10,11] to convert a user’s identifying information to a point on the underlying elliptic curve.
This operation is also time consuming and cannot be treated as a conventional hash operation, which is commonly
ignored in performance evaluation. A map-to-point hash function, on the other hand, is usually implemented as a
probabilistic algorithm and is more expensive than a point scalar multiplication in terms of computation time. For
example, in Smart’s protocol [27], each communicating party needs to carry out two pairing operations, one scalar
multiplication and one map-to-point hash operation in each protocol run. However, in many related protocols, the
performance of Smart’s protocol was evaluated by counting only the pairings and scalar multiplications while having
all the map-to-point hash operations ignored. This is partly because all the pairing-based KE protocols require to carry
out map-to-point hash operations.
If we focus on signature-based KE protocols, we can see that the efficiency of the underlying signature schemes
has a significant impact on the overall efficiency of the KE protocols. As one bilinear pairing operation costs much
more than one elliptic curve point scalar multiplication does, it may also be undesirable to adopt a bilinear pairing
based signature scheme [3] to construct a KE protocol if the more efficient signature scheme is available. We will see
later in this paper that in our ID-based KE protocol, we use a signature scheme which does not require any bilinear
pairing operation.
Our contributions. We propose a new ID-based KE protocol which does not require any pairing or map-to-point
hash. It also supports the strongest KGS forward secrecy. The protocol is also shown to be secure under the model
defined by Canetti and Krawzcyk [14]. Our protocol is signature-based, in which the signature scheme is ID-based
and is a variant of the BNN-IBS proposed by Bellare et al. in [5]. We show that our scheme is secure and also requires
either less storage space or runtime computation than the BNN-IBS. On the performance of our ID-based KE protocol,
we show that it is faster than all other comparable protocols.
Paper organization. In Section 2, we review some previously proposed ID-based KE protocols. In Section 3, we
give a definition for ID-based signature schemes. This is followed by the description of our ID-based signature scheme
and its security analysis in Section 4. In Section 5, we propose an ID-based KE protocol and analyze its security using
a modular approach proposed by Bellare et al. [4]. Performance evaluation of the protocol is given in Section 6. We
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Related work
The concept of ID-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [26]. The idea is to let a user’s identity
be his public key, and have his corresponding private key be generated by a publicly trusted Key Generation Server
(KGS) using the user’s identity and the master secret key of the KGS. An ID-based KE protocol [24,27,15] allows
two communicating parties to generate a random session key such that the key is only known to them. On security,
we generally require that such a protocol should be secure against both passive and active adversaries under some
multi-session setting [7,8,4,14].
In 2002, Smart [27] proposed an ID-based KE protocol based on pairings. It only supports partial forward secrecy.
In the same year, Yi [28] proposed a modification on Smart’s protocol. The modified protocol is more efficient and
supports perfect forward secrecy. Recently, a proven secure ID-based KE protocol was proposed [23], which also
supports perfect forward secrecy. However, none of these schemes is able to support the strongest KGS forward
secrecy.
In [15], Chen and Kudla proposed a protocol which supports KGS forward secrecy and has also been proven
secure under a model similar to the Bellare–Rogaway model [7,8]. On performance, their protocol requires each
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communicating party to carry out one pairing operation, four scalar multiplications and one map-to-point hash
operation.
As a remark, in any of the protocols reviewed above, each communicating party always needs to carry out at least
one pairing, one scalar multiplication, and one map-to-point hash. As mentioned in the beginning of this section,
one pairing operation is at least 10 times more expensive than one scalar multiplication; and one map-to-point hash
operation is also more expensive than one scalar multiplication. Hence, most of them do not have much advantage in
terms of performance when compared with the old, non-pairing based KE protocols [24,20,18,17].
For protocols proposed in [24,18,17], expensive modular exponentiations are carried out by each of the
communicating parties. Hence, they may not be suitable for implementation on low-power devices either. Protocols
proposed in [20], on the other hand, can be implemented under an elliptic curve group and one of the protocols is
believed to support the KGS forward secrecy. However, the performance of that protocol is slightly less efficient than
our protocol. In addition, it is not known to be provably secure.
Comparing all these protocols with our protocol described in Section 5, we will see that our protocol not only
supports the KGS forward secrecy, but is also faster than all the comparable protocols mentioned above. We will also
show its security under the model defined by Canetti and Krawczyk [14].
We skip the review of related work on ID-based signature schemes and only go through their security definitions
in the next section. Readers may refer to [5,3] for more information. In 4, we propose an ID-based scheme which
does not need any pairing or map-to-point hash operation, which is known to be very costly. It can be seen that our
ID-based scheme compares favourably even with those recently proposed schemes based on pairings, for example, [3]
and ID-based variants of short signatures based on [9,29], that may be constructed, for example, from the certificate
based approach described in [5].
3. IBS: Security model
To be self-contained, we review the definition and security model of an identity-based signature scheme given by
Bellare et al. [5] in this section. For readers who are already familiar with these definitions, they can safely skip this
section.
An ID-based signature (IBS) scheme is a tuple (MKGen,UKGen, Sig,Ver) of polynomial-time algorithms. The
first three may be randomized but the last one is not.
– A Key Generation Server (KGS) runs the master-key generation algorithm MKGen on input 1k , where k ∈ N is a
security parameter, to obtain a master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk).
– The KGS can then run the user-key generation algorithm UKGen on msk and identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ to generate a
secret key usk for a user identified by ID. It is assumed that usk is securely transported to that user.
– On input usk and message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the signing algorithm Sig returns a signature σ .
– On input mpk, ID, m and σ , the verification algorithm Ver returns an accept/reject decision to indicate whether a
signature σ is valid for identity ID and message m.
For correctness, we require that for all k ∈ N, m ∈ {0, 1}∗, ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, if (mpk,msg) ← MKGen(1k),
usk ← UKGen(msk, ID) and σ ← Sig(usk,m), then Ver(mpk, ID,m, σ ) = 1. We now provide the formal definition
of a secure IBS scheme in terms of existential unforgeability against the chosen message and ID attacks (in short
euf-cma-ida).
Definition 1. Let (MKGen,UKGen, Sig,Ver) be an IBS scheme, A an adversary, and k ∈ N a security parameter.
Consider the game below which is run by a simulator/challenger S.
– S executes MKGen(1k) to get the master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk).
– S runs A on 1k and mpk. During the simulation, A can make queries to the following oracles.
• CreateUser(ID): If ID is not yet created, S executes UKGen(msk, ID) to get the user’s secret key uskID. ID
is said to be created from now on and 1 is returned. Otherwise, (that is, if ID has already been created) 0 is
returned.
• Corrupt(ID): If ID has been created, uskID is returned and ID is said to be corrupted; otherwise,⊥ is returned
for failure.
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• Sign(ID,m): If ID has not been created, return ⊥ for failure. Otherwise, S executes Sig(uskID,m) to get a
signature σ and returns σ . Then, m is said to be signed by ID.
– A is to output a triple (ID∗,m∗, σ ∗).
A wins if Ver(mpk, ID∗,m∗, σ ∗) = 1, ID∗ is created but not corrupted and m∗ is not signed by ID∗. The IBS
scheme is euf-cma-ida secure if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms A, it is negligible for A to
win the game.
In the next section, we describe a new IBS scheme which is euf-cma-ida secure, as defined in this section.
4. An IBS scheme based on EC-DLP
In the following, we first define some notations and then describe the four algorithms (MKGen,UKGen, Sig,Ver)
of our IBS scheme.
Preliminaries. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter, ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ an identity, and m ∈ {0, 1}∗ a message. Let F
be a finite field, C an elliptic curve defined over F, and P an element of a large prime order p in C . Let G be a
cyclic subgroup of C generated by the ‘base’ point P , such that the elliptic curve discrete log problem (EC-DLP)
is intractable. We assume that (C ,F, P, p) is a sequence of system-wide parameters2. Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z p and
H2 : {0, 1}∗→ Z p be two hash functions. For security analysis, we view them as random oracles [6].
Master-key generation
(mpk,msk) ← MKGen(1k): The trusted KGS (Key Generation Server) randomly picks x ∈R Zp and computes
Ppub = x P . The master public key mpk is set to Ppub, and the master secret key msk is set to (x, Ppub).
User-key generation
usk ← UKGen(msk, ID): If ID is not created, the KGS sets the user’s secret key usk to (c, s, ID, Ppub), where
c = H1(Ppub, ID, cPpub + sP) and s ∈ Zp. This secret key is generated as follows.
1.Randomly pick r ∈R Zp, compute R = r P and c← H1(Ppub, ID, R).
2. Compute s = r − cx mod p.
Signature generation
σ ← Sig(usk,m): Given the user’s secret key usk = (c, s, ID, Ppub), a signature σ = (c, T, pi) on message m is
generated as follows.
1. Randomly pick t ∈R Zp, compute T = t P .
2. Compute e← H2(Ppub, ID,m, T, c) and pi = t − es mod p.
Signature verification
1/0 ← Ver(mpk, ID,m, σ ): To verify the user’s signature σ = (c, T, pi) on message m, the verifier computes
e← H2(Ppub, ID,m, T, c) and checks if
c
?= H1(Ppub, ID, cPpub + e−1(T − pi P)).
If the equation holds with equality, return 1; otherwise, return 0. The verification works because of the following
holds.
H1(Ppub, ID, cPpub + e−1(T − pi P)) = H1(Ppub, ID, cPpub + e−1(t − pi)P))
= H1(Ppub, ID, cPpub + sP)
= c.
2 For formality, one can include this set of parameters into the master public/private key pair (mpk,msk), and have this set of parameters be
generated by some prime order elliptic curve cyclic subgroup generator.
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4.1. Discussion
Note that T should be a nonce, that is, each value of T should only be used once. For each new signature generation,
a new T should be used. In addition, the discrete logarithm of T should only be known to the signer. Otherwise, the
user’s secret key usk would be compromised. Hence in practice, the value of t should be destroyed once pi is computed.
It is not difficult to see that the user-key generation algorithm is essentially the Schnorr signature [25] on the user’s
identity. One can also consider our entire IBS scheme to be a non-interactive proof system of a signature on the user’s
identity. The construction approach here is to have the trusted KGS generate a user’s secret key as a signature on the
user’s identity, and then have the user conduct a non-interactive proof system of his secret key (i.e. the signature on his
identity) using the transformation technique due to Fiat and Shamir [16] for converting the proof system to a signature
scheme. This notion has first been discussed by Kurosawa and Heng [22] and Bellare et al. [5, Sec. 7 of the full paper].
A variant of BNN-IBS. We consider our IBS scheme as described above a variant of an IBS scheme called the
BNN-IBS, which was proposed by Bellare et al. in [5, Sec. 7.3 of the full paper]. In the following, we explain the
differences between them and show that our IBS scheme is more ‘friendly’ to low-power devices, as it requires less
storage or computation resources.
In the BNN-IBS scheme, the component c in the user’s secret key, usk, is replaced with R, and the computation of
s is changed to r+cx mod p. In other words, component c is computed as H1(Ppub, ID, sP−cPpub) in the BNN-IBS
scheme, and the user’s secret key usk now becomes (R, s, ID, Ppub) where R = sP − cPpub. To sign a message m,
the following steps are carried out, and a signature σ = (R, S, T, pi) is generated.
1. Compute S = sP , randomly pick t ∈R Zp and compute T = t P .
2. Compute e← H2(Ppub, ID,m, R, S, T ) and pi = t + es mod p.
To verify the signature, c = H1(Ppub, ID, R) and e = H2(Ppub, ID,m, R, S, T ) are first computed, and the following
equations are then checked for equality.
pi P
?= T + eS (1)
S
?= R + cPpub. (2)
First of all, compared with our scheme, the signature size of the BNN-IBS scheme is larger. Secondly, the BNN-IBS
scheme requires one more scalar multiplication for computing S in signature generation than ours. Although this
additional operation can be saved by precomputing S and then caching it at the signer’s side, it will then require the
signer to have more memory space for caching this precomputed value. It turns out that the BNN-IBS scheme either
requires one more scalar multiplication during the runtime of signature generation, or needs more storage space than
our scheme.
The BNN-IBS scheme has been shown to be euf-cma-ida secure (Definition 1) in the random oracle model [6]
under the assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is hard (in [5, Sec. 7.3 of the full paper]). In the following,
we show that our IBS scheme is also euf-cma-ida secure.
Theorem 1. If there exists a PPT adversary A which wins the game of Definition 1 for the IBS scheme proposed
above with probability at least , then there exists a PPT adversary B which wins the game of Definition 1 for the
BNN-IBS scheme with probability at least .
Proof. We describe how to construct B when A is given. As defined in Definition 1, a challenger S simulates a game
which captures the notions of adaptive chosen message attacks and ID attacks. At the end of the game, the adversary
in the game is to output a triple (ID∗,m∗, σ ∗) such that ID∗ is not corrupted, m is not signed by ID∗, and σ ∗ is a
valid signature of ID∗ on message m∗.
Given an adversary A which breaks the euf-cma-ida security of the IBS scheme proposed above, we construct an
adversary B, which will break the euf-cma-ida security of the BNN-IBS scheme by running A and answering A’s
queries as follows.
– CreateUser: B relays such a query directly to S and relays back the answer from S to A.
– Corrupt: B relays such a query to S. Suppose the user’s secret key usk returned by S is (R, s, ID, Ppub), B then
queries S for H1(Ppub, ID, R). Suppose the answer of S is c¯. B then sets c to−c¯ mod p (will be explained shortly)
and sends (c, s, ID, Ppub) to A as the simulated answer to A’s Corrupt query.
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– Sign: B relays such a query to S. Suppose S’s answer to query Sign(ID,m) is σ = (R, S, T, pi), B then queries
S for H1(Ppub, ID, R). Suppose the answer of S is c¯, then it must be the case that R = S − c¯Ppub for having σ be
valid according to (2) on Section 4.1. B sets c to −c¯ mod p and sends σ ′ = (c, T, pi) toA as the simulated answer
to A’s Sign(ID,m) query.
– H1: For any query of H1 from A, B relays it to S. Suppose the answer of S is c¯, B sets the answer for A to
−c¯ mod p.
– H2: For any query of H2 from A, B handles it in the following two cases depending on the query input.
Case 1: If the query is on (Ppub, ˜ID, m˜, T˜ , c˜) where T˜ is some point and −c˜ mod p is the answer of S on query
H1(Ppub, ˜ID, R˜) for some point R˜, then B queries S for H2(Ppub, ˜ID, m˜, R˜, S˜, T˜ ) where S˜ = R˜ − c˜Ppub.
Suppose the answer of S is e¯. B sets the answer for A to −e¯ mod p.
Case 2: Otherwise (that is, at least one component of the input does not satisfy the form shown in Case 1), B
randomly picks a value in Zp as the answer toA. Consistency (for replying the same value for the same queries)
is maintained by having a table of queries, values, and answers maintained by B.
When A outputs a valid signature (c∗, T ∗, pi∗) with message m∗ and identity ID∗, due to the random oracle
assumption, A must have queried for c∗ = H1(Ppub, ID∗, R∗) where R∗ is some point in order to pass all the steps
of signature verification described in Section 4 (Note that the return of S for that H1 query is −c∗ mod p.). B sets
σ ∗ = (R∗, S∗, T ∗, pi∗) where S∗ = R∗ − c∗Ppub and outputs the triple (ID∗,m∗, σ ∗).
Analysis. To check the correctness of the simulation, first note that the uskNew = (c, s, ID, Ppub) of our protocol
satisfies
c = HNew1 (Ppub, ID, sP + cPpub)
while the uskBNN−IBS = (c¯, s, ID, Ppub) of the BNN-IBS satisfies
c¯ = HBNN−IBS1 (Ppub, ID, sP − c¯Ppub).
By setting c = −c¯ mod p, we can see that the output of HNew1 is the complement of that of HBNN−IBS1 . Hence, in the
simulation above, we set the answer to A for queries of H1 to the complement of the answer made by S for obtaining
the reduction. Due to a similar reason, we also need to set the answer toA for queries of H2 to the complement of the
corresponding answer given by S.
Obviously, the running time of B is a polynomial of that of A. In addition, from A’s point of view, all queries are
simulated or relayed correctly. A cannot distinguish a simulated environment and a real game. Hence, if A makes a
forgery of the IBS scheme proposed above, the reduction above correctly transforms the forgery to a forgery of the
BNN-IBS scheme. 
5. An ID-based key exchange protocol
We now propose an ID-based key exchange (KE) protocol. The KE protocol is built using the IBS scheme described
above. In the following, we first describe our scheme, then analyze its security under the Canetti–Krawczyk model [14]
(in short, CK-model), and finally in the next section, we show that the scheme is much faster than the previously
proposed protocols.
Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. Let A and B be the initiator and responder, respectively. They are identified by
IDA, IDB ∈ {0, 1}∗, respectively. Let the secret key uskA of A be (cA, sA, IDA, Ppub) and the secret key uskB of B
be (cB, sB, IDB, Ppub), which are generated according to the User-key Generation algorithm described in Section 4.
Suppose A and B have a unique session-id ψ , shared already. We will give more details on the generation of ψ shortly.
Below is the description of the ID-based KE protocol which is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Step 1. A picks tα ∈R Zp, computes α = tαP , and sends (IDA, ψ, α) to B.
Step 2. Upon receipt of (IDA, ψ, α), B picks tβ ∈R Zp, computes β = tβ P and sends (IDB, ψ, β, cB, TB, piB) to
A, where (cB, TB, piB) is B’s signature on message mB = (ψ, β, α, IDA). B also computes the session key
γ = tβα and erases tβ .
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A→ B : IDA, ψ, α
A← B : IDB, ψ, β, cB, TB, piB
A→ B : IDA, ψ, cA, TA, piA
Fig. 1. An ID-based KE protocol.
Step 3. Upon receipt of (IDB, ψ, β, cB, TB, piB), A checks the correctness of each component in the incoming
message and checks if the signature verification algorithm Ver(Ppub, IDB,mB, (cB, TB, piB)) returns 1,
where mB = (ψ, β, α, IDA). If the verification succeeds, A sends (IDA, ψ, cA, TA, piA) to B where
(cA, TA, piA) is A’s signature on mA = (ψ, α, β, IDB). A then computes γ ′ = tαβ, erases tα , and outputs the
session key γ ′ under session-id ψ .
Step 4. Upon receipt of (IDA, ψ, cA, TA, piA), B checks the correctness of each component in the incoming
message and determines if the signature verification Ver(Ppub, IDA,mA, (cA, TA, piA)) returns 1, where
mA = (ψ, α, β, IDB). If the verification succeeds, B outputs the session key γ under session-id ψ .
As suggested by the authors of [14], in practice, the session-id ψ can be a pair (ψ1, ψ2), where ψ1 is a value chosen
by A such that (with very high probability) it is different from the values in other sessions of A and ψ2 is chosen by B
in a similar way. These values can be exchanged by the parties as a prologue [21]. Alternatively, ψ1 can be included
by A in the first message of the protocol above, and ψ2 be included by B in the second message.
5.1. Security analysis
The protocol can be viewed as a Diffie–Hellman key exchange followed by a signature-based mutual authentication.
TA and TB correspond to the key contributions of A and B, respectively, and signatures (cA, TA, piA) and (cB, TB, piB)
of the IBS scheme proposed in the previous section correspond to the mutual authentication. In the following, we show
that the protocol can be constructed using the modular approach introduced in [4,14].
The modular approach has two steps. In step one, a KE protocol is designed and shown to be secure in an
ideal model called AM (Authenticated-links Model). In step two, the KE protocol is then emulated using some
Authenticator such that the emulated protocol will be secure in a real-world model called UM (Unauthenticated-
links Model). In AM , there is an adversary A sitting on the links between all the communicating parties, and is
responsible for delivering messages faithfully. A cannot inject or modify messages. However, A can choose not to
deliver it. There are also several oracles available for A to query, that include corrupt, reveal session state, reveal
session output, etc. These oracles are used to capture the capabilities of A (for details, please refer to [14]). In
UM, the adversary denoted by U is essentially the same as the AM adversary A, but without the above restrictions
on delivering messages. Remark: Each step in the above protocol description is considered to be atomic, and no
corruption or reveal session can interrupt any step.
An Authenticator C is an algorithm that, on input a protocol τ , outputs another protocol C(τ ) such that C(τ )
emulates τ in UM. We say that C(τ ) emulates τ in UM if we can show that for any attack that the adversary U
can launch against C(τ ) in UM, the AM adversary A can already launch the same attack against τ in AM . Please
refer to [14] for the formal definition of Authenticator. The method of constructing an authenticator is given in [14],
where a layered approach is used. In this approach, an authenticator C is constructed from MT-authenticators, and
each of them emulates the basic message transmission protocol. The basic idea is that whenever a party A wants to
send or receive a message, we emulate it using an MT-authenticator. Below is a signature-based MT-authenticator [4].
Suppose party A wants to send message m to party B. The following three-move protocol is carried out.
A→ B : m
A← B : m, N
A→ B : m, SIGA(m, N , IDB)
N ∈R {0, 1}k is a random challenge and SIGA is the signature generation function of A. The signature scheme is
required to be existential and unforgeable against the chosen message attack [19]. In the following, we show that the
ID-based KE protocol shown in Fig. 1 can be constructed using this modular approach.
We start from the Protocol 2DH (a two-move Diffie–Hellman protocol in the AM) described in [14]. The protocol
is reviewed as follows.
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Table 1
Performance comparison
Smart [27] Yi [28] Chen–Kudla [15] Our protocol
Pairing 2 1 1 0
Scalar multiplication 2 3 4 6
Map-to-point hash 1 1 1 0
A→ B : m1 = (IDA, ψ, α = tαP)
A← B : m2 = (IDB, ψ, β = tβ P).
In [14, Theorem 8], Protocol 2DH is shown to be secure in AM under the assumption that the Decisional Diffie–
Hellman problem is hard. We then transform Protocol 2DH in AM to a protocol in UM by applying the signature-
based MT-authenticator above to m1 and m2 of Protocol 2DH above. After that, we use the optimization technique
described in [4,14] to reduce the number of message flows from six to three. The resulting protocol is illustrated
below3.
A→ B : IDA, ψ, α
A← B : IDB, ψ, β, SIGB(mB)
A→ B : IDA, ψ, SIGA(mA).
In the protocol, mB = (IDB, ψ, β, α, IDA) and mA = (IDA, ψ, α, β, IDB). To instantiate the signature scheme using
the IBS scheme described in Section 4, we have SIGA become (cA, TA, piA) and SIGB become (cB, TB, piB). In
addition, from the computation of e in the signature generation phase, we can see that some components in mA and
mB are also redundant. By further eliminating those redundant components, the final optimized protocol will become
the one shown in Fig. 1.
In the following, we further evaluate our ID-based KE protocol by considering some additional features and attacks
that are not captured by the CK-model.
KGS forward secrecy. Our ID-based KE protocol constructed above using the modular approach of [4,14] is
essentially the Protocol SIG-DH of [14] which is secure under the CK-model. This also implies that the protocol
satisfies perfect forward secrecy. Although the CK-model does not capture KGS forward secrecy, we can still see that
our protocol supports KGS forward secrecy, as session keys are solely derived from contributions α and β.
Key compromise impersonation resilience (KCIR). As defined in [12], a protocol provides resistance to key
compromise impersonation if the compromising of the long-term secret of a party A does not allow the adversary
to masquerade to A as a different party. To see that compromising A’s secret uskA does not allow the adversary to
masquerade to A as B, we notice that the adversary has to provide a signature of B in the second message of the
protocol before A accepts. As long as α is a nonce and B’s signature is existentially unforgeable, the adversary cannot
provide a correct signature. Similar reasons can be applied to explain the KCIR of B as well.
6. Performance analysis
In Table 1, we summarize the number of different operations of some well-known ID-based KE protocols and our
protocol proposed above. We ignore the time taken by conventional hash operations and point addition operations as
they are much more efficient when compared with pairings, scalar multiplications, and map-to-point hash operations.
According to the state-of-the-art results in [1,2], one pairing operation requires at least 10 times more
multiplications in the underlying finite field than a point scalar multiplication does in the same finite field. Hence,
those pairing-based KE protocols are much slower than the one proposed in this paper. When compared with old,
non-pairing based protocols such as [24,18,17], our protocol is also much faster because each communicating party
of these old, non-pairing based protocols needs to do expensive modular exponentiation operations. For protocols
proposed in [20], they can be implemented under an elliptic curve group, and one of the protocols in [20] is also
believed to support KGS forward secrecy. On its performance, the protocol requires each communicating party to
3 This is identical to the Protocol SIG-DH in [14].
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carry out seven scalar multiplications. Hence, it is slightly less efficient than our protocol. In addition, the protocol
is not known to be provably secure. In [13], Burmester showed that the protocol is vulnerable to an attack called the
triangle attack. Since the triangle attack is captured in the CK-model and our protocol is proven secure in this model,
our protocol is not vulnerable to this attack.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an ID-based signature scheme and showed that it is a variant of the BNN-IBS scheme
proposed by Bellare et al. [5]. Our scheme is more efficient than the BNN-IBS one, as it requires either less storage
space or less runtime computation. Using our ID-based signature scheme, we proposed a new ID-based KE protocol.
The protocol does not require any pairing operation or map-to-point hash operation. It also supports the strongest
KGS forward secrecy. For security analysis, we show that it can be constructed using the modular approach of [4]. As
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